VAT Distortions. There is increasing frustration with the performance of VAT and the distortions its creates because the tax net is narrow and businesses are often unable to deduct VAT payments on their inputs.  First, despite the low threshold, the number of 17, 000 businesses registered is quite low by international standards.  Second, a true VAT, which is supposed to avoid tax cascading and economic distortions, requires a prompt and full refund of the part of the tax on inputs which exceeds the tax due on outputs. This is especially important for exporters. In Georgia the amount of unpaid VAT refunds is large (about 29 million GEL at the end of 2001). Tax inspectors should eliminate the practice of treating VAT as advanced payments against future tax liabilities in order to meet their monthly revenue targets (see section on tax administration below). Third, while many countries have introduced limited exemptions or reduced rates in their VAT laws to reduce regressive elements of the tax, the scope of tax privileges in the Georgian VAT continues to increase, and the country has embarked on the dangerous path to use tax privileges as a way to compensate for administrative or legal deficiencies.

Frustration with the distortion effects of the VAT has caused some policy makers to consider whether to replace the VAT with a sales tax. The objective would be to reduce compliance risks by applying the tax to one stage of the business cycle only. There are serious concerns regarding this idea. VAT despite its relatively low efficiency has become the main revenue source, contributing 45 percent to total gross tax revenues in 2001. Experience in other countries shows that sales taxes have a far lower revenue potential than the VAT, because it does not capture the total value added in the production and distribution phases and their rates normally are not higher than 5 percent--because of administrative difficulties. In addition, compliance risks and compliance management challenges would not be reduced because collection would have to rely on the retail sector which is more difficult to administer. Rather than replacing the VAT with a sales tax, the focus should be to improve VAT administration and actually implement the key principles of the tax, such as an effective refund system for exporters. A performance of the tax improves; consideration could then be given later to lowering the standard VAT rate.

Proposed simplified tax. To compensate for the revenue loss caused by increasing the VAT threshold, MoF plans to introduce a simplified tax for taxpayers who are not registered for VAT, and to modify the current presumptive tax for individual enterprises, which raises relatively little revenues (in 2000 actual presumptive tax collection was only 5 million GEL or 0.7 percent of total tax revenues), by changing it to a fixed tax with a broader tax base. The MoF proposal is to levy the simplified tax rate of 7 percent on gross income, which will require some basic accounting.  The fixed tax will, similar to the current presumptive tax, be based on the nature of the business activity, the size of the business and the business location; it will include more types of small businesses than the presumptive tax. Although some (Foreign Investor Advisory Service (FIAS) December 2001 report[6]) consider a fixed tax to be extremely complicated, it need not be so. The fixed tax, if well designed, can be transparent and easy to administer tax.  It offers no scope for negotiation to taxpayers, does not require detailed bookkeeping, and could reduce the opportunity for corruption and the compliance costs for taxpayers. There are some issues regarding this presumptive taxation scheme:

The combined fixed tax and simplified tax is supposed to compensate for the increase of the VAT threshold. However, estimated revenues from the fixed and the simplified tax are 27 million GEL, which is far less than the expected decrease in VAT revenues. While the increase of the VAT threshold and the introduction of the fixed tax are laudable reforms, the revenue impact of the reform will need to be studied further.

Parliament has rejected the proposed simplified tax because it considers the rate (7 percent) too high and the coverage too narrow. According to some parliamentarians, the scope of the tax should extend to some larger businesses, which clearly reflects the interest of certain business sectors to simplify and reduce taxation. Presumptive taxation based on gross figures should be limited to Small & Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) with no sufficient bookkeeping, while all larger businesses are required to keep books and records and are taxed on a net basis. There is no good reason to extend the scope of the simplified tax to larger tax payers.

Excise Taxation.  Due to its open borders and weak administrative capacity Georgia faces major problems collecting excise taxes. Reduction in excise tax rates has been the preferred method to improve compliance, but with no positive results so far. Despite this experience the trend to reduce excises continues, which is worrisome. Georgian excise taxes are actually very low by international standards already, and the focus should more be on efficiently enforcing the excise tax regime. Compared to the CIS country average, excise tax revenues in Georgia are low; in 2000 excises in Georgia contributed 1.5 percent to GDP, while the CIS average was 2.1 percent. Looking at neighbouring countries, excise revenue performance is much higher in Armenia with 2.5 percent of GDP and somewhat higher in Russia with 1.9 percent of GDP; it is much lower, however, in Azerbaijan with only 0.5 percent of GDP (which is together with Tajikistan the lowest figure in the CIS region). The fact that Georgia has managed to accumulate a surprisingly high level of tax arrears in an area where arrears normally should not build up – according to IMF data the amount of tax arrears on excises was equivalent to 2.7 percent of GDP by beginning of 2000 – shows, however, that excise revenue increases will also depend on the ability and support of the tax administration to collect revenues from major businesses in the oil and cigarette industry.

Income and social tax.  The high tax burden of the personal income tax (PIT) and the social security tax provides a strong incentive to evade the payment of these taxes.  Although the personal income tax has reasonably progressive rates (from 12 percent to a maximum of 20 percent), the marginal cost of taxes for both employees and employers creates strong incentives not to formalize the labor contract: employees prefer current to future consumption, while employers seek to reduce costs and increase competitiveness. Overall, the taxation rate of the PIT and the social security tax over the net wage is 68 percent.  This implies that for each additional GEL paid to worker in net wage, there is 0.68 GEL to be paid in taxes if the contract is formalized. Financing of the pension system continues to suffer from low compliance in the area of social taxes.  (for more details see Social Protection Chapter).

Corporate and income tax exemptions. The Tax Code currently includes a  number of exemptions from corporate and personal income tax, which narrow the tax base, increase the discretion of tax inspectors and the potential for corruption. The IMF has recommended to review and abolish many of these exemptions.  The Ministry of Finance has started preparing an amendment to the Code eliminating most of the current exemptions from personal and corporate income tax. This includes in particular the exemptions from CIT for enterprises in mountainous regions, the exemption of profit generated by energy renewable sources, consumer appliances and energy saving equipment.  However, this proposal to amend the Code will still have to be finally presented to the Parliament, after it was withdrawn in September 2001.

Administrative provisions for tax enforcement. An essential feature of a good tax code is a clear definition of tax administration procedures and rights and obligations of taxpayers and tax officials. A reasonable balance needs to be defined between the interests of the taxpayer to simplify taxation procedures and reduce administrative burden and the interest of the tax administration to effectively enforce taxation. In Georgia, the possibility to enforce tax collection has been unduly restricted by reducing the powers given to the tax administration in chapter 42 of the tax code to seize and sell delinquent taxpayer property. As a consequence the only remaining enforcement measure, which does not require a court ruling, is the freezing of a taxpayer’s bank account. Considering the absence of specialized tax courts and the weakness of the court system in Georgia, this does not provide the tax administration with sufficient means to improve its compliance management. Enforcement powers of the tax administration should be harmonized with current practice in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

Abolishing nuisance taxes.  Earlier the World Bank and IMF reports have recommended the elimination of nuisance taxes because they typically have extremely low revenue yield and are a burden for small businesses. The tax package prepared Ministry of Finance included the elimination of some of these nuisance taxes, (e.g., the tax on economic activities, the resort tax, the hotel tax, the advertisement tax, and the tax on the use of local symbols), but no progress has been made partly because these taxes are assigned to local governments. However, due to their very limited revenue potential, they contribute less than 10 percent of total local revenues. Considering the administrative and compliance costs of these taxes the actual revenue gains might even be negative, efforts to eliminate these taxes will need to continue.

1.3.5        Tax Reform Areas

General. The public perception of the quality and fairness of tax and customs administration in Georgia is generally very negative.[7] Substantial and visible improvements on the ground will be needed to begin dispelling this perception. This also requires a political commitment to abolish practices which protect and support special interests of taxpayer groups by introducing special exemptions in the tax legislation, thus eroding the tax base, or/and executing pressure on the revenue authorities to grant favourable treatment to specific taxpayers. It will also be necessary to reduce the incentives for revenue officials to participate in corrupt practices and to develop the necessary control mechanisms to detect and punish such behaviour.

Efforts to reduce capture and corruption are to be complemented by long-term strategies to improve the tax policy design and build revenue administration capacity. Tax policy reforms should focus on overall policy design issues instead of exclusively discussing the level of tax rates. Eventual tax rate reductions will only be feasible if accompanied by broadening of the tax base and administrative improvements. Key to improving administration is the effective implementation of self-assessment and the fair and equitable treatment of all taxpayers. Two areas that require special attention are (a) customs administration, and (b) enforcement of personal income tax and social security contributions.

Short-term Reform Priorities. While substantial capacity building in tax and customs requires long-term strategies, there are a number of essential short-term reform initiatives, which should be launched immediately, to improve revenue performance and reduce tax-related distortions.

Tax policy. The main challenge is to stabilize the tax policy framework, and avoid ad-hoc short-term policy measures.  In general, the revenue impact of tax exemptions should be properly analyzed, and no further exemptions/tax reductions should be introduced without such analysis is explicitly presented in Parliament. Any tax policy changes should be taken in the context of the annual budget. It also recommended that the 2001 tax package prepared by MoF be re-submitted to Parliament, including key elements such as: reducing the scope of exemptions, raising the VAT threshold to GEL 100,000 (or US$50,000) and introducing complementary simplified tax.

Tax administration. A number of actions could be take to support long-term reform efforts:

Discontinue the practice of soliciting advanced payments to meet revenue targets and Design a new performance measurement system with appropriate indicators, supplemented by special incentives to improve revenue administration practices;

Centralize revenue accounts in the Treasury and make payments on “a first come first served basis”;

Begin implementation of special program to control imports through the railway system, especially of petroleum products;

Increase coverage of LTI and focus on improving LTI performance.

• Prepare legislative changes to reintroduce sufficient powers for the tax administration to enforce tax collection.

A Longer-term Agenda. A more comprehensive reform program for the medium and long-term reform of the Georgian revenue system will then need to consider the following issues:

Broadening the base and lowering tax rates.  While some taxes may be relatively high and may promote non-compliance – especially the general VAT rate of 20 percent and the combined tax burden on labor – taxes from excisable products are not fully exploited. A longer term tax policy reform objective for a poor economy like Georgia should  be to reduce the tax burden on consumption and labor. However, this can only be achieved by (a) broadening the tax base of VAT and profit/income taxes; (b) increasing collection by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of tax and customs administration.

Past experience with tax policy reform in Georgia has shown that mere tax rate reductions without corresponding improvements in enforcement and compliance management will not contribute to increasing tax compliance. Rate reductions therefore do seem not feasible as long as revenue losses from the rate reduction cannot be compensated by a broader tax base and a better enforcement. Tax policy reform in Georgia therefore will need to mirror experience with tax reform in OECD countries in the last two decades, where rate reductions (mainly in the area of direct taxation) were achieved through base broadening and improving tax administration.

VAT Reform. The VAT should not be replaced by a sales tax. Rather, the VAT as the mainstay of the revenue system in Georgia should be strengthened. The VAT design appears buoyant, albeit if its base has been eroded by exemptions, privileges, and fraudulent practices involving both tax inspectors and tax payers.  Increasing the threshold and reducing the number of taxpayers will help improve its administration and implement the true spirit of the VAT. Corresponding decreases in revenues can be compensated by introducing a simplified tax, as proposed by Government, and reducing exemptions to broaden the tax base.  The implementation of a true VAT necessarily has to ensure refunds for exporters and zero rated goods. On the administrative side, it is important to advance existing initiatives to improve cross-checking, monitor registration, and regulate invoices.

Tax Simplification. The elimination of nuisance taxes will facilitate administration and reduce the administrative burden on small businesses. In Georgia, nuisance taxes are local taxes generating little revenue. The best would be to eliminate these taxes and find alternative (more solid) own revenue sources for local governments, such as the land and property tax, which are not currently collected centrally (see Chapter IV on Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations). In some cases, these are complemented by a small turnover tax, as is already the case in Georgia.

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