p> 29. The criticism I have referred to also underestimates the
Eurosystem's capacity to act. To the extent that there would be an overall
liquidity effect that is relevant for monetary policy or a financial
stability implication for the euro area, the Eurosystem itself would be
actively involved. The Eurosystem is, of course, well equipped for its two collective
decision-making bodies (the Board and the Council) to take decisions
quickly whenever needed, whether for financial stability or for other
reasons. This readiness is needed for a variety of typical central bank
decisions, such as the execution of concerted interventions or the handling
of payment system problems. Indeed, it has already been put to work during
the changeover weekend and in the first few weeks of this year. A clear reassurance about the capacity to act when really needed
should be sufficient for the markets. Indeed, it may even be advisable not
to spell out beforehand the procedural and practical details of emergency
actions. As Gerry Corrigan once put it, maintaining "constructive
ambiguity" in these matters may help to reduce the moral hazard associated
with a safety net. I know of no central bank law within which the lender-of-
last-resort function is explicitly defined. The question of who acts within the Eurosystem should also be
irrelevant for the markets, given that any supervised institution has an
unambiguously identified supervisor and national central bank. As to the
access to supervisory information, the lack of direct access by the
Eurosystem should not be regarded as a specific flaw of the euro area's
institutional framework, as has been frequently argued, since this
situation also exists at the national level wherever a central bank does
not carry out day-to-day supervision. 30. Finally, the criticism reflects an overly mechanistic view of how
a crisis is, and should be, managed in practice. Arguing in favour of fully
disclosed, rule-based policies in order to manage crises successfully and,
hence, maintain market confidence, is almost self-contradictory. Emergency
situations always contain unforeseen events and novel features, and
emergency, by its very nature, is something that allows and even requires a
departure from the rules and procedures adopted for normal times or even in
the previous crisis. Who cares so much about the red light when there is
two metres of snow on the road? As for transparency and accountability,
these two sacrosanct requirements should not be pushed to the point of
being detrimental to the very objective for which a policy instrument is
created. Full explanations of the actions taken and procedures followed may
be appropriate ex post, but unnecessary and undesirable ex ante. 31. So far, I have focused on the provision of emergency liquidity to
a bank. This is not the only case, however, in which central bank money may
have to be created to avoid a systemic crisis. A general liquidity "dry-up"
may reflect, for example, a gridlock in the payment system or a sudden drop
in stock market prices. The actions of the Federal Reserve in response to
the stock market crash of 1987 is an often cited example of a successful
central bank operation used to prevent a dangerous market-wide liquidity
shortfall. This kind of action is close to the monetary policy function and
has been called the "market operations approach" to lending of last resort.
In such cases, liquidity shortfalls could be covered through collateralised
intraday or overnight credit, or auctioning extra liquidity to the market.
The Eurosystem is prepared to handle this kind of market disturbance. VI. CONCLUSION 32. In my remarks this evening, I have looked at the euro area as one
that has a central bank which does not carry out banking supervision. This
would be normal, because in many countries banking supervision is not a
task of the central bank. What is unique is that the areas of jurisdiction
of monetary policy and of banking supervision do not coincide. This
situation requires, first of all, the establishment of smooth co-operation
between the Eurosystem and the national banking supervisors, as is the case
at the national level where the two functions are separated. The most
prominent reason for this is, of course, the scenario where the provision
of liquidity from the central bank has to be made in a situation that is
generated by problems of interest to the supervisor. But beyond that, I do
not know any country in which the central bank is not very closely
interested in the state of health of the banking system, irrespective of
its supervisory responsibilities. 33. In my view, we should move as rapidly as possible to a model in
which the present division of the geographical and functional jurisdiction
between monetary policy and banking supervision plays no significant role.
I do not mean necessarily a single authority or a single set of prudential
rules. Rather I mean that the system of national supervisors needs to
operate as effectively as a single authority when needed. While the causes
of banking problems are often local or national, the propagation of
problems may be area-wide. The banking industry is much more of a system
than other financial institutions. 34. I am clearly aware that we are far from having a common
supervisory system. But since the euro has just been launched and will
last, we have to look in prospective terms at what needs to be set in
place. There is no expectation, at least to my mind, that the division of
responsibility in the euro area between the central bank and the banking
supervisory functions should be abandoned. Although the Treaty has a
provision that permits the assignment of supervisory tasks to the ECB, I
personally do not rely on the assumption that this clause will be
activated. What I perceive as absolutely necessary, however, is that co-
operation among banking supervisors, which is largely voluntary but which
finds no obstacles in the existing Directives or in the Treaty, will allow
a sort of euro area collective supervisor to emerge that can act as
effectively as if there were a single supervisor. This is desirable in the
first instance to render the supervisory action more effective against the
background of current and future challenges and, second, to assist the
Eurosystem in the performance of its basic tasks. TABLES Table 1. Market share of branches and subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions as % of total domestic assets, 1997 From EEA countries From third countries TOTAL Branches Subsidiaries Branches
Subsidiaries AT 0.7 1.6 0.1 1.0 3.4 BE 9.0 19.2 6.9 1.2 36.3 DE 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.2 4.2 ES 4.8 3.4 1.6 1.9 11.7 FI 7.1 0 0 0 7.1 FR 2.5 NA 2.7 NA 9.8 IR 17.7 27.8 1.2 6.9 53.6 IT 3.6 1.7 1.4 0.1 6.8 NL 2.3 3.0 0.5 1.9 7.7 SE 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.7 UK 22.5 1.0 23.0 5.6 52.1 Source: ECB report "Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in the medium to long term" (February 1999). Table 2. Assets of branches and subsidiaries of domestic credit institutions in foreign countries as % of total domestic assets, 1997 In EEA countries In third countries TOTAL Branches Subsidiaries Branches
Subsidiaries AT 2.6 NA 3.7 NA NA DE 12.0 7.3 7.8 0.9 27.9 ES 5.5 1.4 2.1 5.9 14.9 FI 5.9 0.3 6.6 0.3 13.1 FR 9.1 6.9 9.4 3.8 29.2 IR 8.3 14.9 1.3 10.1 34.6 IT 7.2 2.7 3.8 1.5 15.2 SE 7.2 NA 5.4 NA NA Source: ECB report "Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in the medium to long term" (February 1999). Table 3. Concentration: Assets of the five biggest credit institutions as % of total assets 1985 1990 1997 AT 35.8 34.6 48.3 BE 48.0 48.0 57.0 DE NA 13.9 16.7 ES 38.1 34.9 43.6 FI 51.7 53.5 77.8 FR 46.0 42.5 40.3 IE 47.5 44.2 40.7 IT 20.9 19.1 24.6 NL 69.3 73.4 79.4 SE 60.2 70.02 89.7 UK NA NA 28.0 Source: ECB report "Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in the medium to long term" (February 1999). Table 4. Number of branches and subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions, 1997 From EEA countries From third
countries TOTAL Branches Subsidiaries Branches
Subsidiaries AT 6 20 2 11 39 BE 25 16 15 15 71 DE 46 31 31 45 153 ES 33 21 20 6 80 FI 9 0 0 0 9 FR 46 118 43 98 305 IR 18 21 3 7 49 IT 36 4 17 4 61 NL 11 8 11 19 49 SE 14 0 3 1 18 UK 106 18 149 114 387 Source: ECB report "Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in the medium to long term" (February 1999). Table 5. Private non-financial enterprises' bonds, credit institutions' bonds and government bonds outstanding as % of GDP, 1997 Private Credit Government non-financial institutions' bonds bonds bonds AT 2.7 31.1 30.6 BE 10.0 38.3 111.0 DE 0.1 54.6 37.6 ES 2.6 4.5 52.9 FI 3.7 7.1 35.5 IE 0.01 1.6 32.2 IT 1.6 19.4 100.4 NL NA 43.1 53.4 SE 3.6 38.6 46.5 Source: ECB report "Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in the medium to long term" (February 1999). Euro and European integration Speech delivered by Eugenio Domingo Solans, Member of the Governing Council and the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the "Euro and Denmark" exhibition in Aalborg, Denmark, on 10 September 1999 INTRODUCTION It is a real pleasure for me to participate in the "Euro and Denmark"
exhibition in Aalborg. It is the first time since my appointment as a
member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB) in May
1998 that I have had the opportunity to speak in Denmark. Thank you for
your invitation and for asking me to share my views on the euro and on
European integration with investors and experts of this "pre-in" country. I should like to refer to two main topics. First, and more
extensively, allow me to explain the ECB's view and my own view on the role
of the euro as an international currency. After this I intend to make some
brief comments on the key role that the euro and the Eurosystem are playing
in the process of European economic integration. Before I begin, I should like to add that it goes without saying that
the institutional position of the ECB - and therefore my own official
position - concerning Denmark's entry to the euro area is one of strict
neutrality. This is an issue which has to be decided by the Danish people,
whenever and in whatever way they deem appropriate. THE EURO AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY The three basic functions of the euro Every currency fulfils three functions: store of value, medium of
exchange and unit of account. Concerning the first function (store of
value), the euro is used and will increasingly be used as an investment and
financing currency by market players, and as a reserve currency by public
authorities. Regarding the second function of money (medium of exchange),
the euro is used and will increasingly be used as a payment or vehicle
currency for the exchange of goods and services and for currency exchange
itself. It will also have an official use as an intervention currency.
Finally, as regards the third function of any currency (unit of account),
the euro is used and will increasingly be used by economic agents as a
pricing or quotation currency and as a pegging currency by the authorities
responsible for exchange rate issues. Let me give you some information about the present use of the euro in
each of these areas. I shall first refer to the private use of the euro,
after which I shall consider its official public usage. The euro as a store of value The available information seems to confirm that the euro already
plays a significant role as an investment and financing currency in
international financial markets. Without going into precise details (1),
regarding the international debt securities market (money market
instruments, bills and bonds), it can be said that in the first two
quarters of 1999 net international issues denominated in euro amounted to
EUR 83.9 billion, compared with EUR 74 billion for the US dollar and EUR
50.9 billion for former euro area national currencies and ECUs during the
same period of 1998. In other words, in the first two quarters of 1999 net
international issues of debt securities denominated in euro were 13.4%
higher than those denominated in US dollars, and 64.8% higher than those
denominated in former euro area national currencies and ECUs issued during
the same period of last year. With regard to equity markets, the weight of euro area stock
exchanges in terms of capitalisation ranks a clear second, far behind the
United States. As to the banking sector, the latest data show that, at the end DX
:>48@>2:0 ?;5=:8T- -#"+ !-+ 1999DXCODE.HTof March 1999, above 40% of
deposits and loans vis-а-vis non-residents were denominated in euro, with
the share of the US dollar almost as high. The euro as a medium of exchange As for the second function of money (medium of exchange), the euro
needs more time to develop as a payment currency for goods and services in
international trade and as a vehicle currency in the foreign exchange
markets. Although no precise data are available at this stage, the value of
world exports denominated in euro is not likely to differ significantly
from that of euro area exports. By contrast, the value of world exports
settled in US dollars is nearly four times as high as that of US exports.
This difference can easily be explained by the combined and reinforcing
effects of network externalities and economies of scale in the use of a
predominant international currency, as is the case with the US dollar. The euro as a unit of account The use of the euro as a unit of account (its third general function)
is closely linked to its use for the other two main functions. The use of a
currency as a unit of account is, in a way, the basis for its use as a
store of value or as a medium of exchange. The value stored in euro, or the
payments made in euro, will tend to be recorded in euro. Therefore, we can
conclude that the euro is playing an ever larger role as a unit of account
for all the financial assets linked to the use of the euro as an investment
and financing currency, and has a much less relevant role as a standard for
pricing goods and services, owing to the widespread use of the US dollar as
a payment and vehicle currency in international trade. The convenience of
using a single standard for pricing commodities in the international
markets, allowing traders to make direct comparisons between prices, makes
it difficult for the euro to acquire a significant role in this respect. We
can conclude that the development of the euro as a unit of account will
follow the pace at which the issuers or suppliers of assets, goods or
services priced or quoted in euro obtain a predominant position in the
international markets. The official use of the euro The euro also has official uses as reserve, intervention and pegging
currency, all three functions being strongly interrelated in most cases. With regard to its official use, the euro is currently the second
most international currency after the US dollar, this being a legacy of the
former euro area national currencies. Compared with the former euro area national currencies, there has
been a technical decline in the share of the euro as a reserve (and,
therefore, as an intervention) currency, mainly owing to the fact that such
former national currencies became domestic assets within the euro area.
However, there are good reasons to expect an increase in international
public use of the euro as a reserve and intervention currency, inasmuch as
the public authorities understand that it is worthwhile to allocate their
foreign reserves among the main international currencies and to give the
euro a relevant share in accordance with its internal and external
stability and the economic and financial importance of the euro area. In connection with the use of the euro as a pegging currency,
approximately 30 countries outside the euro area currently have exchange
rate regimes involving the euro to a greater or lesser extent. These
exchange rate regimes are: currency boards (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Estonia); currencies pegged to the euro (Cyprus, FYROM [the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia] and 14 African countries in which the CFA franc is
the legal tender); currencies pegged to a basket of currencies including
the euro, in some cases with a fluctuation band (Hungary, Iceland, Poland,
Turkey, etc.); systems of managed floating in which the euro is used
informally as the reference currency (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and
Slovenia); and, last but not least, European Union currencies pegged to the
euro through a co-operative arrangement, namely ERM II. As you well know,
Denmark and Greece joined ERM II on 1 January 1999 with a ±2.25%
fluctuation band for the Danish krone and a ±15% fluctuation band for the
Greek drachma. Although the euro remains in second position after the US
dollar in terms of its official use, the role of the euro will increase in
the future, without a doubt.
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