policy was enforced as a key of foreign and domestic policies, the

reassertion of the Armenian claim began to unfold again and acquire support

from Armenian Diaspora in the West. In 1965, the fiftieth anniversary of

the genocide was marked by demonstrations in Armenia. Demonstrators made

it clear that their top priorities were the reunification with Karabakh and

establishment of a monument into commemoration of the genocide. The

monument was built, yet the petition for the reunification was declined

again.[15]

Then began Gorbachev era, during which the “nationality question”

became a sensitive issue not only in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The history

of the conflict proved that it didn’t develop suddenly, however it

escalated as a nationality problem in a multinational state during periods

of crisis or sociopolitical changes in ideology and a governmental

structure. Preceding 1987 Gorbachev didn’t approach the problems with

ethnic groups within USSR from ethno-psychological perspective, which was

perceived as an interfering element for a functioning economic

internationalism.[16] Instead, he identified the nationality question with

the “total economic complex,” with “national distribution of resources,”

and “intra-national division of labor” in the Soviet Union.[17]

When the conflict broke out, Gorbachev had to accept the failure of

his affirmation of the “national question, which has been basically

solved,” that he made himself three months earlier. As the conflict was

growing more complicated, Gorbachev referred the Karabakh crisis as the

outcome of local mafia disagreements.[18] Soviet central government

refused to take any actions towards solving the conflict when it still was

at a negotiable stage. However, lack of competency and willingness not to

let bloodshed to begin caused first pogroms of anti-Armenian nature in

Sumgait, an industrial city of Azerbaijan. The same governmental

negligence led to liquidation of thousands of Armenians in Turkey in the

early twentieth century.

On 12 and 13 February 1988, the district councils of Mountainous

Karabakh adopted a resolution that called for a meeting of the Regional

Council of Deputies of Mountainous Karabakh for the purpose of examining

the issue of reunification. On the 21st, this council voted in favor of

reunification by a large majority, providing a legal basis for Armenian

demands.[19]

The massacres that took place on February 28-29 brought in tragedy and

interrupted the peaceful events. A few dozens of Armenians according to

official records, were killed by Azerbaijanis in the industrial city of

Sumgait, although estimates range is as high as two hundreds. The

percentage of the Armenian population estimated less that 10% of all

inhabitants of Sumgait. During the night of 27 February several hundreds

of Azerbaijanis armed with weapons and flammable liquids raped, tortured

and burned alive victims after beatings and torments. There were hundreds

of wounded who became invalids. The rapes included rapes of underage

girls. More than two hundreds houses were destroyed and robbed;

automobiles owned by Armenians were burnt or smashed. Thousands of

refugees fled to Armenia and Russia.[20]

The past became present. Such words as “pogroms,” “massacres,” and

even “genocide” became current vocabulary words in the turbulence of the

events. This provoked resurrection of memories and implied immediate,

direct analogy with the Genocide of 1915. The Azerbaijanis related by

race, language, and culture to the Turks were perceived by Armenians as the

same savage executors who carried out the genocide of 1915.[21]

There were traced some indirect evidences that led Armenian community

to suspect Azerbaijani governmental authority being involved in these

murders.

1. During the days preceding 27 February, the Third Party Secretary of Baku

personally participated in several violently anti-Armenian television

broadcasts.

2. Some Azerbaijanis in Sumgait, knowing the massacres were coming three

days before the 27th, warned some Armenians of their fate.

3. Piles of rocks were delivered beforehand by trucks to the outskirts of

the Armenian quarters.

4. The killers were brought to Sumgait in special coaches and vans.

5. Telephone lines linking Sumgait and the outside world were cut before

the killings.

6. Soviet soldiers stood aside for three days, doing nothing to put a stop

to the massacres.

The indifference of Moscow towards the massacres was expressed clearly by

giving no orders to Azerbaijani government and Soviet troops that were

located precisely on the boarder of Armenia and Azerbaijan to stop the

violence. Is it a repetition of what Turkish government did against

Armenians who were a subject of Ottoman Empire in 1915? There was no

explicit approval from the Kremlin on measures Azerbaijanis took against

Armenian population, yet there was no immediate response to it either. The

official record displayed 32 deaths for the three days of the outrage;

however, during the entire year of 1988, the case didn’t take place in

court. As the memories of the genocide became vivid the Azerbaijani

authorities played with this psychological trauma caused many years ago and

passed into a new stage of fear by letting Armenians know they had gone too

far and, thus jeopardizing those who reside in territories governed by

Azerbaijan.[22]

By November and then aggravating in December 1988, pogroms started to

spread in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. The attitude towards Armenian

population rapidly began to decline after Sumgait pogroms with only

periodic help from the Soviet Army. Breaks out of hostility and hatred

were directed even at religious objects. The Armenian Cathedral in Baku

was burned. On December 5, 1989, crowds of Azeris started threatening

Armenian population. Gangs of young Azerbaijanis (age range was 16-30),

carrying the Turkish flag stopped buses, checked ID’s of passengers and

after tracking down an Armenian they would pull a person out of a bus and

beat him/her (!) up, regardless of age of the victim. Such violence and

cruelty are not easy to understand, for Armenians and Azerbaijanis were

living in peace and harmony prior to the events. The perpetrators

apparently were given the implicit approval from the Azerbaijani government

in regards to Armenians. Azereis were granted with right to do whatever

they wanted with Armenian population. In stores if a sales person

suspected in a customer an Armenian, a clerk would refuse to sell bread to

that person. And the more harming assaults are not even to mention. They

raped young pregnant women and older women, torturing and outraging them;

Azeris poured their victims with gasoline and burned them. The entire city

seemed infected by hysteria. On the day of the earthquake in Armenia

Azerbaijanis were jumping up and down in celebration of the catastrophe,

rejoicing over sufferings of other humans. Only on January 19, 1990, a

state of emergency was declared and 20 000 Soviet troops were dispatched to

put down the riots again the Armenian population of Azerbaijan.[23]

Many Armenians made a direct analogy between events in Azerbaijan and

1915 in Turkey. Armenians living in Baku and Sumgait were assimilated with

the native population. Intermarriages were popular and well accepted by

people. Most Armenians living in Azerbaijan sent their children to Russian

schools, and therefore, the primarily spoken language was Russian even at

homes. Hence, the history of Armenia was more known from books and family

memories rather than through official teaching. Therefore, how can be

explained hasty leaving by 350 000 Armenians their homes, possessions and

lifetime memories except that they feared the old scenario to be played

again. The pogroms left houses in Armenian quarters of Baku ravaged,

however, the massacres of 31 people in Sumgait and 160 in Baku (according

to official records, though the number might be underestimated) is a

relatively small number. Hence, the explanation for such massive reaction

of Armenians can be found in a historical memory that led to conviction

that Armenians refused to be scapegoats again. There is a palpable

parallel between sociopolitical status of Armenians in Azerbaijan and

Armenian in Turkey on the eve of slaughtering. In both cases Armenians

were a prosperous element of the society they lived in, however, they were

in minority, thus obviously suitable for any kind of persecution.

Ironically, but pogroms and killings in Sumgait and Baku as well as the

compulsory migration of Armenians to Armenia and Russia might have

prevented a second cycle of genocide against Armenian population.[24]

Some aspects in analogy between 1915 and 1988-90 don’t fit the large

scaled picture, compiled of both tragic periods of the Armenian history.

However, some parallels are obvious. For example, deprivation of basic

essentials and lack of even first necessities present during the blockade

against the Republic of Armenia and while deportation of Armenians was

carried out in Ottoman Empire. Also, the sadistic tortures against

Armenian population took place in both Sumgait-Baku massacres and the

genocide. Moreover, there is an ideology and attitude of perpetrators in

both cases played an important role. There were cases in Turkey where

officials refused to follow the orders of the central government and to

carry out execution of innocent people and many Turks hid their Armenian

neighbors in their houses, thus saving their lives. The same way some

Azerbaijanis treated Armenians, as interviews with survivors testify.

However, the overwhelming majority of Azerbaijanis and Turks celebrated

festively deaths of Armenians, and that was common in both cases.

Although, the pogroms in Sumgait and Baku resemble more the pogroms

of the late nineteenth century rather than the genocide of 19154, yet the

methodology and ultimate purpose were figuring as major aspects of

projecting the genocide of 1915 to massacres in 1988-90. The political

environment was also an important element of the turmoil, for if Armenians

didn’t side with Russians in the early twentieth century and if Armenians

didn’t claim reunification with Karabakh in the late nineteenth century,

all of the bloodshed would have not, perhaps, take place at all. [25]

The Karabakh crisis reveal much about the transgenerational

psychological impact of genocide. In the best of circumstances, the trauma

persists for decades, even generations and manifests itself in a very

unexpected way. The trauma is clearly compounded when the perpetrators are

left unpunished, when there are no acts of contrition or indemnification,

and when external society or governments find it inexpedient to join in

remembrance. Historical memory forcefully shapes contemporary outlook. The

past is present[26].

-----------------------

[1] Alfred Schultz, “The Phenomenology of the Social World” (Evanston,

Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967)

[2] Donald E. Miller ,“The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting events

in the Republic of Armenia,”in Richard G. Hovanessian (ed.) “Remembrance

and Denial” (Detroit, Michigan, Wayne State University Press, 1998) p.187

[3] Frank Chalk “Redefining Genocide,” ed. George J. Andreopulos Genocide:

Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia, University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1994) pp. 48-50.

[4] Richard G Hovanessian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide”

ed. George J. Andreopulos Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions

(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) pp.111-112

[5] Donald Miller “The role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events in

the republic of Armenia,” ed. Richard G. Hovanessian Remembrance and Denial

(Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1998) p. 197

[6] R. G. Hovanissian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide,” ed.

G.J. Andreopulus Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions

(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University Press, 1994) pp.117-121

[7] Gerald J. Libardian “The Ultimate Repression: The Genocide of the

Armenians, 1915-1917” in I. Walliman and M. Dobkowski (ed.) Genocide and

the Modern Age (Westport, Connecticut, Grrenwood Press, 1987) p. 204

[8] Ibid., p. 205

[9] Ibid., pp. 204-206

[10] Richard G. Hovanissian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian

Genocide,” G.J. Andreopulus (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical

Dimensions” (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University Press, 1944) p. 115

[11] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit, Wayne

State University Press, 1995) p. 82

[12] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake, (Michigan,

Wayne State University Press, 1995) p.82

[13] Alexander Benigsen “The Caucasian Fuse”, Arabies, nos. 19-20

(July/August 1988)

[14] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake, (Michigan,

Wayne State University Press, 1995) pp. 82-83

[15] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit, Wayne

State University Press) p.83

[16] Uwe Halbach “Anatomy of an Escalation: The Nationality Question”,

Federal Institute for Soviet and International Studies (ed.) The Soviet

Union 1988-1989, Perestroika in Crisis? (San Francisco, Westview Press,

1990) p.73

[17] Pr, 8 February 1986

[18] Uwe Halbach “Anatomy of Escalation: The Nationality Question”, Federal

Institute for Soviet and International Studies (ed.) The Soviet Union 1988-

1989, Perstroika in Crisis? (San Francisco, Westview Press, 1990) p. 74

[19] Pierre Verluisse Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit,

Wayne State University, 1995) p. 86

[20] Donald E. Miller “The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events

in the Republic of Armenia” Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.) Remembrance and

Denial (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1998) p. 191

[21] Richard G. Hovannisian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian

Genocide”, G. Andreopoulos (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical

Dimensions (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press,1994) p.116

[22] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit, Wayne

State University Press, 1995), p. 89

[23] Donald E. Miller “The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events

in the Republic of Armenia”, Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.) Remembrance and

Denial: The Case of Armenian Genocide (Detroit, Wayne State University

Press, 1998) pp. 192-195

[24] Ibid., pp. 196-197

[25] Ibid., pp. 197-199

[26] Richard G. Hovannisian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian

Genocide”, George J. Andreopoulos (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical

Dimensions (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press,1994) p.117

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